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NOTES
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND FIRST
AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE
COMPULSION OF TESTIMONY
Recent appraisals of Congressional investigations have expressed
both commendation of the results obtained and, in many instances, criticism of the methods used.' Although the problem of determining the
proper limits of the Congressional power of inquiry is not new,2 these
restrictions have not been precisely delineated because of a paucity of
opportunities for judicial review.3 The gravamen of the problem is the
determination of the rights and privileges of a witness before Congressional committees.
Refusal by a witness to testify on grounds of First Amendment
freedoms and the "right" of privacy is a recent manifestation of this
enigma. 4 Such recalcitrance is based upon either a lack of power to cor1. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated: ". . [W]e would have to be that 'blind'
Court, against which Mr. Chief Justice Taft admonished . . . that does not see what
'[a]ll others can see and understand,' not to know that there is wide concern, both
in and out of Congress, over some aspects of the exercise of the congressional power
of investigation." United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953). See also Galloway,
Congressional Investigations: Proposed Reforms, 18 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 478, 480 (1951).
2. "A legislative committee of inquiry vested with power to summon witnesses and
compel the production of records and papers is an institution rivalling most legislative
institutions in antiquity of its origin." Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HAav. L. REv. 153, 170 (1926). The first investigating committee of the Congress of the United States was created on March 27,
1792, by a resolution in the House instituting an inquiry into the cause of the disaster
to General St. Clair and his army in the Northwest. Id. at 159.
3. On the barrenness of judicial precedents contrasted with the liberal use of
investigating committees, see Landis, supra note 2, at 212-213. However, the lack of
cases may be contrasted with the profusion of scholarly comment on the problem.
Boudin, Congressional and Agency Investigations: Their Uses and Abuses, 35
VA. L. REv. 143 (1949) ; Cousens, The Purpose and Scope of Investigations under
Legislative Authority, 26 GEo. L.J. 905 (1938); Fulbright, Congressional Investigations:
Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. oF CHI. L. RL. 440 (1951); Galloway,
supra note 1; Gose, The Limits of CongressionalInvestigating Power, 10 WASH. L. REV.
61, 138 (1935); Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, 33
CoL. L. REv. 1 (1933) ; Landis, supra note 2; Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B. U. L. Rev. 337 (1953); McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 U. oF CHI. L. Rxv. 425 (1951); MORGAN, Conge'essional Investigations and Judicial Review: Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37
CAi -F. L. REv. 556 (1949); Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection
Against Governmental Intrusion in Political Affairs, 47 MicH. L. Rev. 181 (1948).
4. It would seem that in many instances witnesses have failed to distinguish between
rights which they may have under the First Amendment and those which may be
the result of a common-law right of privacy as to governmental invasion. The two
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pel testimony or a right of the witness precluding exercise of this power. 5
Although the power of Congress to investigate is not unlimited, 6
the extent of the power of investigation still renders any limitations of
slight practical value to the witness. Since the authority of Congress to
investigate is not expressly granted by the Constitution, it has been implied by the Supreme Court as being necessary and appropriate to the
effective exercise of the express powers.7 However, Congress may only
require testimony in response to questions which are pertinent to the
matter under investigation s and may not inquire into the private affairs
of a citizen. 9
concepts are not identical, and possibly much confusion has resulted from this lack of
differentiation. See Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Liacos,
supra note 3, at 364; N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1953, p. 20, Col. 2; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Sept. 29, 1953, § 2, p. 2, col. 3.
5. This discussion will not consider any rights or privileges which the witness
may have by virtue of the Fifth Amendment. In the event that the proposed federal
"immunity statute" is enacted, enabling committees to compel incriminating testimony by
granting immunity from federal prosecution, it would appear that the Fifth Amendment will be of much less importance to the witness.
Moreover, the rights under the First Amendment are of much more vital national
concern than those under the Fifth Amendment. The latter amendment actually affects
only those persons who are called as witnesses, whereas, should the freedoms of the
First Amendment be abridged, the effect may well extend to all persons, whether or not
they appear as witnesses.
6. The Supreme Court has often intimated that the power to investigate is not
unlimited. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929); Barry v. United
States, 279 U.S. 597, 614 (1929) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-174 (1927);
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478 (1894); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
7.

"•

. . [T]he two houses of Congress, in their separate relations, possess not

only such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such
auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective.
• . . We are of the opinion that the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

.

. ."

McGrain v.

Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-174 (1927). See also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S.
263 (1929); Barry v. United States, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661 (1896) ; Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947), and authorities there
cited.
Congress also has the power to imprison a recusant witness for contempt until he
may submit to its demands to answer propounded questions or produce required papers;
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927). The witness may also be prosecuted in the courts under 52 STAT. 942 (1938),
2 U.S.C. § 192 (1946), which provides for punishment as a misdemeanor contumacy
before a Congressional committee. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1896). See Gose,
supra note 3.
8. ". . . [I]t is a necessary deduction from the decisions in Kilbourn v. Thompson
and In re Chapman that a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the bounds
of the power are exceeded or the questions are not pertinent to the matter under
inquiry." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927). Moreover, the question
of pertinency is a matter of law. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929).
See also United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 152-156 (3d Cir. 1953).
9. This rule was declared by the Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
190 (1880);

". .

. neither of these bodies [Houses of Congress] possesses the general

power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." The Court, in McGrain
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While a refusal by a witness to testify in response to questions
actually not pertinent to the inquiry cannot be punished, there seems to
be no way in which this can be satisfactorily established at the hearing.
Consequently, the witness must hazard prosecution for contempt each
time he refuses to answer on this ground. Furthermore, it is often impossible, even in judicial proceedings, for him to rebut the committee's
claim of pertinency.' 0
Similarly, the limitation that neither House has the power to inquire
into the private affairs of a citizen seems now to be ineffective. This
restriction, imposed by the Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson, was based
on the holding that the power to compel testimony relating to private
affairs was a judicial power which could not properly be exercised by
the legislature." However, the subsequent decision in the Sinclair case
negated the efficacy of this limitation by declaring that if a propounded
question is pertinent to an authorized Congressional investigation, private affairs may be invaded and the answer compelled.' 2 Thus, this
limitation also involves the previous problem of determining pertinency.
v. Daugherty, after examining the cases to that date affirmed the Kilbourn decision,
stating that the following proposition could be considered as settled law: "... . [N]either
House is invested with 'general power' to inquiry into private affairs and compel disclosures. . . ." 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927). Such limitations are grounded on the doctrine
that there is a fundamental ". . . right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or
unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of . . . personal and private affairs."
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929).
10. Pertinency for purposes of a Congressional inquiry has been defined as meaning ". . . pertinent to a subject matter properly under inquiry, not generally pertinent
to the person under interrogation." Rumley v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 177 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). The range of matters subject to Congressional
power, however, is such that an inquiry may now be conducted into almost any matter
of national interest. Gose, supra note 3, at 150-151. Moreover, Congress need not
specify in advance the purposes for which the inquiry is conducted, and it need not
legislate or attempt to legislate upon the precise facts developed. The subject matter
need only be so related to a matter upon which Congress is authorized to legislate as
to make possession of information in this area valuable in considering legislation. In re
Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1896) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). "If the
subject under scrutiny may have any possible relevancy and materiality, no matter
how remote, to some possible legislation, it is within the power of the Congress to
investigate the matter. Moreover, the relevancy and the materiality of the subject
matter must be presumed." United States v. Bryan, 72 F.Supp. 58, 61 (D.D.C. 1947).
See also Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Also a
witness is bound to judge correctly as to the element of pertinency since his honest
mistake of law is no defense. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929). See
also Nutting, supra note 3, at 215 . For a general discussion of the problem of determining pertinency, see Morgan, supra note 3, at 571; McGeary, supra note 3, at 436.
11. ". . . [W]e are of opinion that the House of Representatives not only exceeded
the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly
exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in its nature
clearly judicial." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1880).
12. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) ; United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d
148 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Since any limitations on the power of Congressional committees to
compel testimony actually afford the witness only slight protection, he
must rely to a greater extent on any affirmative rights which he may have.
The decision of Kilbourn v. Thompson, apparently created a "right" of
privacy. But the subsequent decision in the Sinclair case abrogated this
protection when the propounded questions were pertinent to the subject
under investigation. 13 Moreover, it is now questionable whether or not
the requirement of pertinency need be met. 14
The contention that the witness' right of privacy is invaded by the
compulsion of testimony has often been intermixed with a similar argument that First Amendment freedoms are also abridged.' 5 Recently
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to determine the validity of this
position.' 6 The Court, however, declined to consider this issue and held
instead that the witness could not be compelled to answer since the question exceeded the bounds of the committee's authority under the Congressional resolution directing the investigation.17 Nevertheless, the concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas concluded, contrary to
the reasoning but not the result of the majority, that the committee did
have the authority to compel the testimony but could not because of the
rights of the witness under the First Amendment.'
Previous cases have presented the issue to lower federal courts and
have resulted in determinations unfavorable to the existence of such a
13. See Morgan, supra note 3, at 569.
Moreover, this resulting limited protection offered by the right of privacy has been
further criticized by one authority who contends that no right of privacy should exist
at all in the Congressional investigating situation. Landis, supra note 2. Mr. Landis
submits that in a Congressional inquiry as in a judicial proceeding, any interests in
privacy are completely overbalanced by the interests in efficient government, and the
fact that testimony may relate to private affairs should present no bar to its compulsion.
Id. at 219.
14. Recently the court in United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947),
when presented with the contention that certain questions invaded the right of privacy
of the witness and therefore should not be compelled, stated that whether or not an
investigation may be invalid because private affairs may be made public ". . . is open
to question," citing Kilbourn v. Thompson and the article by Landis. Id. at 88. The
court then authorizes the compulsion, holding the questions pertinent. Id. at 89. However, the opinion raises an issue as to whether or not questions invading the right of
privacy could be compelled even though not pertinent.
15. A recent case in which the First Amendment has been alleged as a ground
for refusal to testify is now being considered by the Supreme Court. Emspak v.
United States, 203 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 74 S. Ct. 23 (1953).
16. United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
17. Id. at 44.
18. "The Court is repudiating what the House emphatically affirmed, when it now
says that the Select Committee lacked the authority to compel respondent to answer
the questions propounded." United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953). "Since
Congress could not by law require of respondent what the House demanded, it may not
take the first step in an inquiry ending in fine or imprisonment." Id. at 58.
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right. 1 9 Barsky v. United States is the major case in point. 20 The court
considered, as must always be done in these cases, whether or not First
Amendment freedoms are abridged by compulsory testimony and, if so,
under what circumstances this is valid. The court stated that they "would
assume, without deciding," that compelling a witness to answer would
"impinge upon speech and not merely invade privacy;' ' 21 nevertheless,
it decided that in this instance such a restriction was justified. 22 However, the rationale of the opinion is not clear. Although the court may
have assumed that inquiry does affect speech, it never precisely delineated
the manner or extent of the abridgement. 23 This suggests a failure to
perceive the actualities concerning free speech in this situation which
would, of course, preclude rational analysis of the validity of this restriction.
The court might have interpreted the contention-First Amendment
freedoms are infringed when a witness is compelled to testify-as dependent upon the validity of this reasoning: The First Amendment
guarantees freedom of speech; this right to speak also implies the right
not to speak; therefore, to compel a person to speak is equivalent to preventing him from speaking and violates the First Amendment. However, any argument for an equivalent freedom of silence is precluded
by an analysis on the basis for the First Amendment's provision relat24
ing to speech: promotion of free and open discussion of all issues.
19. Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Marshall v. United
States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Barsky v. United States, 167 F2d 241 (D.C.
Cir. 1947); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
20. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
21. Id. at 250.
22. Id. at 249.
23. It would seem that in many instances the issues concerning the First Amendment have not been clearly presented to the courts nor have the courts themselves
clearly stated the problem:
"Despite all this, it is argued in behalf of this appellant that the First Amendment forbids the gathering of information by a duly authorized Congressional committee. . . . The theory seems to be that investigation of Un-American or subversive
propaganda impairs in some way not entirely clear the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." (emphasis supplied) United States v. Josephson, 165

F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947).
24. ".... [T]heir purpose [First Amendment freedoms] has evidently been to protect
parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free
discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any
time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion
by just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people

have conferred upon them."

CooL=,, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

885 (8th ed. 1927).

Mr. Justice Brandeis has quite succintly summarized the purposes of speech:
"Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; . . . that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public dis-
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Freedom of speech serves this purpose; freedom of silence, per se, obviously does not. The Barsky court apparently discerned the invalidity
of this reasoning and, 25 failing to recognize any other manner by which
the First Amendment could be abridged, perhaps concluded it was not
actually restricted.
Another method of analysis reveals that compulsion of testimony
by Congressional inquiry does abridge the freedoms of speech and press.
Possibly this reasoning may have been one of the considerations motivating the concurring opinion in the Rumley case. This analysis admits
that a freedom of silence does not exist. However, this does not preclude the existence of a limited privilege to remain silent when that is
necessary to prevent an abridgment of the freedoms of the First Amendment. To determine how this may occur, it is necessary to examine the
practical results of compelling certain testimony before a Congressional
committee.
Although an individual may readily expound an unpopular view
before individuals or groups of his own choosing, it is doubtful, in most
instances, whether he would desire to broadcast these same opinions to
the nation through the medium of a Congressional committee. To force
disclosure of unpopular speech may affect the witness by resulting in
loss of prestige, employment or friends. 26 Knowing this, a person may
refrain from expressing any opinion which might be termed controversial through fear of subsequently being called before a Congressional
committee and being forced publicly to divulge or affirm his previous
statements.
As pointed out by the Court in American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 27 governmental encroachments of individual freedoms of speech
and press are no longer confined to direct and candid abridgment.2 8
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of fie
American government." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
25. The Barsky court also pointed out and recognized the basis for free speech:
"The public policy which supports freedom of speech is that the safety of democratic
government lies in open discussion-discussion of grievances, remedies, of 'noxious
doctrine' as well as of popular preferences." 167 F.2d 241, 249-250 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
26. Judge Edgerton, dissenting in the Barsky case, states: "That the Committee's
[House Committee on Un-American Activities] investigation does in fact restrict
speech is too clear for dispute. The prosecution does not deny it and the court concedes it. The effect is not limited to the people whom the Committee stigmatizes or
calls before it, but it extends to others who hold similar views and to still others who
might be disposed to adopt them. It is not prudent to hold views or to join groups that
the Committee has condemned. People have grown wary of expressing any unorthodox
opinions. No one can measure the inroad the Committee has made in the American
sense of freedom to speak." Id. at 255. The point had also been made by Judge Clark
in his dissent in United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 100 (2d Cir. 1947).
27. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
28. Id. at 399. "'It is not often in this country that we now meet with direct and
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Modern methods are much more subtle and are, therefore, correspondingly more dangerous since they may escape casual appraisal. If compelling testimony causes individuals to refrain from expressing controversial opinions or discussing issues subject to possible Congressional
inquiry, the purposes of free speech have been severely restricted. Because
".. . even the most timid and sensitive cannot be unconstitutionally restrained in the freedom of his thought

....

-29 the fact that certain in-

trepid individuals might not be deterred from expressing such views,
even though they might be subsequently compelled to affirm them publicly, does not justify abridgment of any individual's freedom of speech.
The other basic freedom of the First Amendment-that concerning
freedom of the press-may also be restricted by the compulsion of testimony. This was illustrated in the concurring opinion of the Rumley case.
In this instance the witness was asked to testify concerning certain financial records, which would also reveal the subscribers and purchasers of
the witness' publications. Justices Douglas and Black contended that
if this inquiry were permitted, the press would be subjected ".

.

. to

harrassment that in practical effect might be as serious as censorship..."
and would result in the government holding
'30
over the press."

"...

a club over speech and

Since the compulsion of testimony concerning exercises of First
Amendment freedoms would do more than merely "impinge upon
speech" but would, rather, abridge them, a limited privilege of silence
may be necessary. If the court in the Barsky case was influenced by an
assumption that compulsion of testimony only slightly restricts the First
Amendment, then its conclusion may be subject to re-evaluation in the
light of the Rumley case and this method of analysis.
However, the Barsky court may have determined that testimony
may be compelled in the inquiry situation because of other considerations.
By assuming that compelling testimony does ". . . impinge upon speech
and not merely invade privacy . . . ,"31 they may have inarticulately

accepted the rationale implicit in the Rumley case and developed in the
foregoing analysis. The court was then confronted with the problem of
determining whether or not the First Amendment could be validly
abridged in this instance. In resolving this issue, the court considered
the existing national situation and the relative necessities for inquiry and
candid efforts to stop speaking or publication as such. Modern inroads on these rights
come from associating the speaking with some other factor which the state may regulate
so as to bring the whole within official control.'" The court was quoting Mr. Justice
Jackson, concurring in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547 (1945).
29. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
30. 345 U.S. 41, 48, 58 (1953) (concurring opinion).
31. 167 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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legislation.3 2 While the validity of this reasoning may be questionable,
it illustrates an attempt to resolve the most perplexing problem facing
the courts in the inquiry situation.
33
Recognizing that First Amendment freedoms are not absolute,
the courts have developed various tests to determine when they may be
validly abridged by legislation. The question immediately arises as to
whether or not these tests may be used to evaluate abridgment by inquiry.
Justices Black and Douglas seem to imply vaguely that this may be
proper, stating that: "Since Congress could not by law require of respondent what the House demanded, it may not take the first step in
an inquiry ending in fine or imprisonment." 34
The "clear and present danger" test has existed as a familiar but
ofttimes uncertain test to determine when speech may validly be abridged
by legislation. 3 5 The vital issue here concerns its general applicability
where inquiry compels speech. Probably legislation most analogous to
the inquiry situation is an enactment which purports to compel certain
practices which abridge indirectly the First Amendment freedoms. 3 6
32. Id. at 246-247.
33. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519-525 (1951); United Public Workers
of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) ; Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
But see MEIKLEJOHN, FREs SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment and Evils That Congress Has a Right to Prevent,
26 IND. L.J. 477 (1951).
34. 345 U.S. 41, 58 (1953) (concurring opinion). However, it is never explicitly
made clear which type of legislative test should be used nor how such test should
be applied. Moreover, it is also possible that Justices Black and Douglas were thinking
in terms of an absolute restriction on the exercise of Congressional powers in this
area and thus did not consider any tests to determine whether or not such abridgment
might be valid under certain circumstances.
35. Justice Holmes, in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), first
established this test.
The original purpose of this test was to determine at what point certain speech
became an incitement or a criminal attempt to violate a constitutional statute. See
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 81-82 (1941), for a discussion of this
concept as derived from Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
For a general discussion and analysis of the cases applying the clear and present
danger test, see Justice Frankfurter concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 529-561 (1951); CHAuEE, loc. cit. supra. See also Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines"
and the "Clear and Present Danger" Rule, 38 VA. L. REV. 143 (1952) ; Corwin, Bowuing
Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 Norxm DAME LAW. 325 (1952); Mendelson, Clear
and Present Danger-FromSchenk to Dennis, 52 COL. L REv. 313 (1952).
36. Such a situation was presented to the Court in American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). This case involved the determination of the
constitutionality of Section 9 (h) of the labor Management Relations Act which
required that union officers execute an affidavit stating that they are not Communists
and do not believe in Communist principles. The Court admitted that the freedoms of
the First Amendment were restricted stating that: The provisions of this statute
" ... undoubtedly lessens the threat to interstate commerce, but it has the further
necessary effect of discouraging the exercise of political rights protected by the First
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Evaluation of this type of restriction, according to the Supreme Court,
must be accomplished by weighing the interests of the government in
the particular legislation against the interests of the individual in exercising these freedoms to determine which one prevails under the par37
ticular circumstances.
Apparently, the danger test is similarly inapplicable to investigations in which the witness is compelled to testify since analogous problems exist. There are two possible methods by which it could be employed *inthis situation. The committee may either contend that the
actual prior exercise of these freedoms constitutes a clear and present
danger or it may argue that the lack of information concerning these
exercises constitutes such a danger. The problem is the same in either
case. In order to establish the existence of the danger to justify compulsion of the testimony, the testimony must be compelled. 38 This is an
illustration of the problems inherent in applying the danger test to evaluate situations for which it was not designed. As pointed out by the Court
in the Douds case it is not an absolutistic dogma with universal validity.3 9
The test was devised to help determine when the actual past exercise of
First Amendment freedoms constituted sufficient danger to justify their
abridgment. It may not be used with equal applicability to determine
when a certain situation, which is inimical to a governmental purpose,
may be remedied with First Amendment freedoms indirectly abridged
in the process.
Perhaps the Barsky court partially recognized this difficulty when it
refused to apply the danger test to evaluate the inquiry situation;40
Amendment. Men who hold union office often have little choice but to renounce Communism or give up their offices. Unions which wish to do so are discouraged from
electing Communists to office." Id. at 393. However, the Court concluded that the
"clear and present danger" test was not the proper method of determining whether or
not such abridgment would be valid, contending that the danger test is not an absolutist
test and does not automatically apply as a proper method of evaluating any First Amendment abridgement. Id. at 394-396.
37. "When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and
the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty
of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances presented." Id. at 399.
38. The information may be vital or it may be of little consequence. It may be contended that in many instances the value of the information sought to be compelec
could be determined from the nature of the question. However, this would certainl)
not be true in the majority of instances in which an answer other than "yes" or "no'
was required.
But see a dictum to the contrary in which the court apparently failed to recognize
these difficulties. National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 16!
(D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 334 U.S. 854 (1948).
39. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542-544 (1951) (concurrinj
opinion).
40. ". . . [F]or the judicial branch of government to hold the legislative brand

NOTES
however, it apparently objected because the committee could seldom prove
that either the previous exercise of First Amendment freedoms or a lack
of information concerning such exercises constitute a clear and present
danger. Thus, the committee might be unable to obtain information.
The court attempted to resolve the problem by changing the criterion
from clear and present danger to danger "reasonably represented as
potential." 41 It must be granted that this new standard would eliminate
any difficulties of proof but only because "reasonably represented as potential" is actually no test at all. It merely requires a determination of
whether or not there was a rational basis for the investigation.
It would appear that the reason for the adoption of this new "test"
is a belief that some standard must be used which would embody the
principle of the danger test. However, this fails to recognize that the
principle itself is inapplicable to the inquiry situation. Probably no test
embodying this principle will be adequate. Because the criterion the court
adopted provided no standards for evaluation, its judgment ultimately
rests upon a determination of ".

.

. the relative necessity of the public

interest as against the private rights."4 2 Thus, for practical purposes,
it utilizes the balancing of interests process proposed in the Douds case.
The balancing of interests test can be validly applied to the inquiry
situation. However, it must be recognized that use of that process here
may differ in many respects from application to legislation which directly
prohibits the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 43 In the latter
instance, the interests to be balanced and weighed are apparent-the
individual interest in the exercise of the particular freedom restrained
and the public interest protected by restraining the exercise of such
freedom. In the inquiry situation, however, the circumstances would be
quite dissimilar and subject to other considerations. The First Amendment freedoms are not restrained directly but, rather, as a result of a
particular governmental action-compelling testimony. Moreover, the
interest opposing that of the individual is not that of restraining the
exercise of these freedoms for the public good but is a governmental
interest-compelling testimony and seeking information to assure an
effective legislative process. The governmental interest may restrict any
to be without power to make such inquiry until the danger is clear and present would
be absurd. How except upon inquiry would the Congress know whether the danger

is clear and present?" 167 F.2d 241, 246-247 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
41. Inquiry may be necessary ". . . when danger is reasonably represented as
potential. There was justification here, within the bounds of the foregoing restriction
for the exercise of the power of inquiry." (emphasis supplied) Id. at 247.
42. Id. at 249.
43. Justice Frankfurter proposed this test to evaluate legislation. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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of the First Amendment freedoms; such restraint may not only extend
to the particular witness but to anyone disposed to exercise these rights.
Therefore, the public interest in the exercise of First Amendment freedoms must be included on the side of the individual interest and balanced
against the interest of the government in obtaining the desired informa44
tion.
It may be contended that the governmental interest in compelling
testimony is much greater than that interest involved in a direct abridgment of these rights by legislation since information obtained by committee inquiry is necessary for an effective legislative process. However,
this greater governmental interest will not necessarily prevail over the
individual interest here because the individual interest is actually the
public interest in the First Amendment freedoms. The Barsky court
recognized that the governmental interest would be greater in an investigation but did not also recognize that the individual interest would be
similarly increased. 45 Therefore, if the court sought to balance these
interests, the greater governmental interest readily justified the compulsion of testimony.
The result in the Barsky case may have occurred through a combination of circumstances. To say, however, that the court's decision
sanctioning compulsion of testimony was clearly erroneous would neither
be accurate nor fair to the court. Assuming that their final determinations involved a virtual attempt to balance the interests, it would appear
that their decision might have been otherwise had they considered the
increased weight to be given the individual interest. Nevertheless, whenever this process is used as a means of evaluating abridgment of First
Amendment freedoms, the resulting decision of the court can never be
44. The individual interest here is a combination of the personal interest of the
particular individual being examined and the general public interest in the freedoms
of the First Amendment. Too often the social interest in the First Amendment is
neglected, and the "individual interest" is considered as only encompassing the personal
desires of the particular witness.
"The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There is an
individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital
to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth....
"The great trouble with most judicial construction . . . is that this social interest
has been ignored and free speech has been regarded as merely an individual interest,
which must readily give way like other personal desires the moment it interferes with the
social interest in national safety." CHAFEE op. cit supra note 35, at 33-34.
"The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the
overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the nw-re imperative is the need to
preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press, and free assembly
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people. . . ." (emphasis supplied)
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
45. 167 F.2d 241, 247, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947).

NOTES
clearly erroneous. The very nature of the process involves ascribing to
the courts the duty of deciding when these freedoms may be validly
abridged. The balancing of interests is merely a means by which the
court renders a policy decision without the benefit of any concrete norms.
However, the balancing of interests process could serve as a method
of determining the validity of compelling testimony if the courts recognize that: To compel testimony in response to questions which concern
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms may abridge these rights;
the governmental interest in Congressional investigations may be much
greater than that in legislation which directly abridges the First Amendment. However, the individual interest here includes the public interest
in the First Amendment and is, thus, also correspondingly increased.
With these two working principles before them, the courts might be able
to deal adequately with this problem, with a view towards eventually
establishing ascertainable limits to the Congressional power of inquiry
when compelling testimony.
Of course, the better solution to the entire problem would be for
Congress to recognize the results of some of its current practices and by
self-restrictive legislation eliminate the problem at its source."" Many
recommendations have been offered to improve current Congressional
procedures in investigations which would at least partially alleviate the
danger of abridging First Amendment freedoms.4 7

U. C. C. CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD THE ADOPTION OF
A CONTRACTUAL CONCEPT OF WARRANTIES
The law has never provided a clearly defined theory of liability
for breach of warranty.' At the time of their inception in the common
law, warranties were based on the tort action of deceit. 2 They evolved,
46. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-540 (1951).
47. Galloway, supra note 1. See also Meader, Limitations on CoiwressionalInvestigation, 47 MIcE. L. REv. 775, 778 (1949); Rogers, Congressional Investigations: The
Problem and Its Solution, 18 U. OF CE. L. REv. 464 (1951) ; Stebbins, Limitations of
the Powers of Congressional Investigating Committees, 16 A.B.A.J. 425, 428 (1930).
1. This is, in part, a result of a failure to objectively evaluate the purposes of
warranties in the beginning. Fuller's comment, in relation to damages, is equally applicable to the law of warranties: "We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit
that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts without the orientation which comes
from the simple inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed?" Fuller and Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
2. The warranty action based on deceit actually preceded the assumpsit action.
Assumpsit was originally considered a tort action but developed shortly into contract.
1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948).

